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PrawfsBlawg: Deferring to agency amicus briefs that present new guidance

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2011

Deferring to agency amicus briefs that present new guidance
In reading some of the Supreme Court's recent cases, I was intrigued by its willingness to defer to administrative
interpretations presented to the Court in the form of amicus briefs filed by the relevant agency or by the Solicitor
General. I refer in particular to Williamson v. Mazda Motor (relying, in part, on a brief expressing the government's
view that a federal vehiclesafety regulation did not preempt a state tort suit) and Chase Bank v. McCoy (deferring to
the agency's interpretation of its own regulation, which was conveyed in an amicus brief). Giving some degree of
deference to positions expressed in agency amicus briefs is not a new development, though it does seem to me that the
Court perhaps used to express a bit more hesitation about doing so.
In any event, whether or not there is a trend in this regard, one interesting feature of deferring to an amicus brief is that
the Supreme Court might be relying on an interpretive authority that did not exist until the Supreme Court's decision to
review the case brought it into existence. (This newauthority scenario doesn't describe every instance in which the
Court defers to a brief. After all, agencies sometimes file briefs in lower courts; plus, some briefs merely restate
administrative guidance offered elsewhere, in which case the deference is not to the brief's position per se.) The right
answer to the case could therefore change as the case moves from the lower court to the high court. That seems, at first
blush, a bit strange. How should we respond to this state of affairs?
There are a few possibilities:
1. Because uniformity, consistency, and predictability are important, the lower courts should do a better job of
conforming their interpretive practices to the Supreme Court's model. Indeed, in Chase Bank v. McCoy, the Supreme
Court seemed to criticize the Ninth Circuit for not inviting the agency to submit an amicus brief. And yet . . . Should we
really expect every lower court in the land to ask for, and wait for, an agency's views whenever a statute administered
by the agency is the subject of litigation? Would the agencies and the Department of Justice welcome a regime in
which they had to take positions like this routinely?
2. Because uniformity, consistency, and predictability are important, the Supreme Court should stop deferring to new
guidance provided in government amicus briefs.
3. No change is needed. When the Supreme Court decides to hear a case, it should try to get the right answer, even if
that means relying on a new source of guidance that was called into existence by its decision to review the case. If
Congress passed a new statute that applied to pending cases, the Court would apply that. Same thing here. (Here I am
borrowing from footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's dissent in Mead.)
Thoughts? (I should add that I recognize that the considerations presented here concern just one aspect of the larger
issue of deferring to agency views expressed in connection with litigation.)
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